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that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria. This paper shows
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modifications for this field. An open subset of economies where none of the
modified rational expectations equilibria fully reveals private information is
found. There are two important pieces. First, there can be information
about a location known by a consumer who does not live in that location
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(endogenous) location of residence, perturbations of utility naturally do not
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
People can never fully comprehend the quality and the circumstances of a
city until they experience a significant part of their life living in that city.
Information on physical amenities of a city (i.e., weather, parks, museums,
crime, traffic jams) is easily acquired by both consumers and researchers,
so there is institutional and academic work on the quality of life in cities.1
However, people cannot completely ensure that they choose the right city
or location within the city for their family before they start experiencing
life there. For example, there could be uncertainty about the quality of
schools, congestion of commuting routes contingent on resident and business
location, or even major highway closures. Current occupants of the city, or
people with friends living in the city, might have information that others
don’t have. Moreover, even though the current environment of the city can
be understood, it is not surprising that the future developments of cities are
not known with certainty, but might be known better by current occupants.2
On the one hand, information about life in a city is reflected in the demand
for housing.3 Since people are rational in understanding and using the rela-
tionship associating a specific state of nature with a specific equilibrium price,
depending on what model people have in mind for how equilibrium prices are
determined, the price of housing can be a signal for people in choosing a city
best suited to their life style. Recall that the concept of rational expectations
equilibrium requires agents to use models that are not obviously controverted
by their observations of the markets. Therefore, the question of whether the
price of housing can play a significant role in transmitting information from
1For example, Rosen (1979), Roback (1982), and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988)
develop a quality of life index for urban areas (QOLI), that measures or implicitly prices
the value of local amenities in urban areas.
2For example, Cronon (1991) discusses the success of Chicago in surpassing other com-
petitive cities, such as St. Louis, in the early development of the Midwest.
3It can also be reflected in wages, but for simplicity we focus on rent.
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informed people to uninformed people not only addresses the question of the
efficiency of housing markets, but is also related to the issue of the existence
of rational expectations equilibrium in urban economics.
Available information is utilized by agents in a rational expectations equi-
librium, especially the information conveyed by equilibrium prices. Radner
(1979) shows that in a particular asset trading model, if the number of states
of initial information is finite then, generically, rational expectations equilib-
ria exist where all traders’ private initial information is revealed. In contrast
to Radner’s model, that fixes state-dependent preferences and then focuses
on the information concerning traders’ conditional probabilities of various
events, Allen (1981) considers a space of economies that is defined by state-
dependent preferences and confirms Radner’s conclusion in that context.
When state space is infinite, Allen (1981) shows that the generic existence
of fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria depends on the condition
that the price space must have at least as high a dimension as the state
space. Jordan (1982) considers the case where the state space has a higher
dimension than the price space and demonstrates that generically there does
not exist a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
The existence of rational expectations equilibria where prices do not fully
reveal the state of nature motivates the development of this paper. As shown
in standard general equilibrium models in the literature, fully revealing ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium demonstrates the efficiency of market prices in
information transmission. The cases where the rational expectations equilib-
rium is not fully revealing are more interesting, for they admit a positive value
of private information (that cannot be learned by observing prices) and space
for discussing purchases of and strategic behavior using private information.
In contrast with standard models, this paper focuses on the existence, with
necessary adjustments for urban economics, of non-fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium. In contrast with Allen (1981), who proves the ex-
istence of an open and dense subset of economies that possess fully-revealing
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rational expectations equilibria in the standard general equilibrium model
with a finite number of states, this paper shows that the analogous result
under reasonable modifications does not hold in urban economies.4 An open
subset of economies is found, where all the modified rational expectations
equilibria of these economies do not fully reveal private information.
Though in different settings, the common intuition behind these economies
is consistent. First of all, households’ bid rents reflect their ex ante valuations
for housing, and the expected valuations reflect households’ information (and
their prior distributions) about the states. However, the equilibrium bid rent
reveals only the winner’s valuation, instead of being determined by all house-
holds’ valuations. This is the economic interpretation of our assumption that
each household can learn from all of the other equilibrium housing prices but
not from the housing price at a household’s equilibrium location. Therefore,
in urban economics, the equilibrium price of land reflects only the ex ante
valuation and the information of the household with the highest willingness-
to-pay for a location. In contrast, the standard general equilibrium model
has aggregate excess demand that is dependent on every household’s demand.
This generates complete information revelation in equilibrium generically, if
there are enough prices. The difference between the models is due to the
standard assumption in urban economics that each person can only consume
housing in one place at one time. The reason households are interested in
and can learn from prices in locations other than their potential equilibrium
locations is that information about the state in another location might cause
them to wish to relocate there, thus disrupting the potential equilibrium.
Generically there still exists a fully revealing rational expectations equi-
librium in urban economies. Once we suppose that all households have full
4Allen (1981, p. 1174) gives an example of rational expectations equilibrium with a
spatial flavor: “If a tract of property which might contain natural resources is for sale,
persons who own neighboring pieces of property know more, compared to the average
trader, about the extent of the mineral wealth contained in the tract which is for sale.
The prices that neighbors are willing to pay reflect their superior knowledge about the
value of potential resources.”
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information, generically each household’s marginal rates of substitution for
different states are distinct. So bid rents in different states are distinct and
thus fully reveal the state. However, the self fulfilling property of a standard
rational expectations equilibrium is not appropriate in urban economies. The
reason is that the winning bid does not necessarily reflect this information,
since only the highest bid is observed by agents. For example, if a household
living in one location at equilibrium has information about another location,
this information might not be revealed in equilibrium rents. In this circum-
stance, it is not reasonable to expect the equilibrium prices to fully reveal
households’ private information, even if there are many prices and few states.
Fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium would require that agents
observe all bids, not just the winning ones.
Consistent with this idea, to allow households to learn states from observ-
ing equilibrium prices but avoid the standard logic, instead of using a stan-
dard rational expectations equilibrium, in an assignment model we adopt a
modified rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) concept admitting that
every household can augment his/her private information from observing
equilibrium prices in all locations except the one that the household uses as
his/her equilibrium location. For that location, they have only their private
information. Under this adjustment for urban economies, the MREE is not
generically fully revealing.
The other important component, that yields an open set of economies
with not all information revealed in equilibrium, concerns perturbations of
utility functions. The set of states affecting utility of households living in
one location is assumed to be different from the set of such states in another
location; in other words, we use a product structure for the state space.
Thus, when we consider perturbations of utility functions, we do not allow
the utility of households living in one location to depend even a little on
states belonging to other locations. This is what we mean when we say
perturbations are spatially local.
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The model that we present covers both within-city locations and the
comparison of different cities, though the latter case is the focus of this
paper.
Here we consider two common models from the urban economics litera-
ture. We conjecture that our results can be extended to other models from
the literature, such as the closed city model, provided that agents can live
in only one location. The proofs for such models appear to be much more
complex.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the basic notation and
model. Two explicit examples give the intuition behind the non-existence of
fully-revealing MREE in Section 3. For generic results, in Section 4, we find
an open subset of economies with no fully-revealing MREE, provided that
perturbations are spatially local. In Section 5, the existence of MREE is
demonstrated. When some household is insensitive (to be defined precisely
in this section), there exists a unique non-fully revealing MREE. When all
households are not insensitive, there exists a fully-revealing MREE. When
spatially non-local perturbations are considered, the results are the same as
the ones in standard general equilibrium models, namely generic existence of
fully revealing MREE. In this case, generically households are not insensitive.
To extend our results beyond an assignment model where only one person
is located in one location, an open-city model is introduced in Section 6.
In this context, an open subset of economies with no fully revealing MREE
still exists even when many people can live in the same place. In Section
7, it is shown that the introduction of financial markets into our model can
restore the existence of a fully-revealing MREE, also restoring efficiency of
equilibrium allocations. Whether the introduction of financial markets is
reasonable is also examined. Section 8 concludes. An appendix contains
proofs.
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2 The Framework
Suppose there are n households indexed by j ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n} and n loca-
tions, k ∈ K ≡ {1, ..., n}, each endowed with a fixed land supply of s¯k. We
consider the case where consumers obtain different utilities from living in
different locations. These could represent either areas within a city or in dif-
ferent cities. Each location is endowed with a state variable, ωk ∈ Ωk, where
Ωk is a finite set, k ∈ K. In our model, ωk represents state-dependent prefer-
ence differences, each realized with a probability that is common knowledge.
Let ω ≡ (ωk)k∈K and Ω = ×k∈K Ωk denote the state and state space of the
economy. Beside locations, in state ω, each household j has to choose the lot
size of his/her house and the consumption of composite good in k, denoted
by sjk(ω), zjk(ω), respectively. Notice that we do not assume inelastic unit
demands for land or housing. Since it is impossible to consume a house at
the same instant in two locations: sjk(ω) > 0 implies sjk′(ω) = 0, ∀k′ 6= k.
Such a locational indivisibility is one of the unique characteristics of land
and houses compared to other commodities. To focus on an exchange econ-
omy, standard in both rational expectations general equilibrium and urban
economics models, suppose that household j earns a fixed income Yj of com-
posite good in all states. We shall introduce a commuting cost, but all of
our arguments hold when commuting cost is set to zero and there is only a
utility difference between locations.5 Consider location 1 as a central busi-
ness district (CBD) and other locations as suburbs. All job opportunities are
located in the CBD. There is only commuting from location k, k > 1 to the
CBD, where the commuting cost from location k to the CBD is denoted by
Tk. It is assumed 0 = T1 < T2 < ... < Tn < min (Yj)j∈N to ensure that there
is no vacant location.
Although our analysis is intended to apply primarily to cities, where
5Since the commuting cost is a numeraire cost instead of a time cost, commuting is not
a form of production in our model.
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there is no intercity commuting, there are circumstances where neighbor-
hoods within a city might have independent state spaces. An example is the
private neighborhood structure in St. Louis.
Each household can consume housing in only one location. Let kj :
Ω → K denote the location where household j lives; that is, kj(ω) =
arg maxk{s∗jk(ω)}, ω ∈ Ω. Denote household j’s consumption plan in k
in state ω as ψjk(ω) ≡ (sjk(ω), zjk(ω)) and let ψj(ω) ∈
⋃
k∈K R2+ denote j’s
consumption plan in state ω. Both kj and ψj are endogenous and determined
in equilibrium. The ex post utility function of household j living in k in state
ω, given ψjk(ω), is denoted by ujk(ψjk(ω), ω), ω ∈ Ω, and the ex post utility
of household j choosing to live in their optimal location is
uj(ψj(ω), ω) ≡ max
k
{ujk(ψjk(ω), ω)}k∈K , ω ∈ Ω.
Let pk(ω) denote the rent per unit of housing in location k in state ω, k ∈ K,
ω ∈ Ω, and normalize the price of freely mobile composite consumption good
to be 1. Let Pk(ω) ≡ [pk(ω) 1] be the price vector for housing and composite
good in k in state ω where the composite good is numeraire. Each household
j’s information structure can be represented by Fj, which is a sigma algebra
of measurable subsets of Ω. The naive optimization problem for household
j ∈ N with n locations, given his/her initial information structure Fj, is:6
max
ψj(ω)
Euj(ψj(ω)|Fj)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
Pk(ω)ψjk(ω) +
∑
k∈K
p sjk(ω)∑
k′∈K sjk′(ω)
q Tk ≤ Yj,
ψjk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ψjk′(ω) = 0, ∀k, k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k
ψj(ω) ∈ R2n+ is Fj-measurable. (1)
Let P (ω) ≡ (Pk(ω))k∈K ∈ R2n+ and P−k(ω) ≡ (Pk′(ω))k′∈K\{k} denote the
prices in all locations in state ω and in all locations except k in state ω,
6The ceiling function, denoted by pθq, is defined by the smallest integer greater than
or equal to θ, i.e., pθq ≡ min{n ∈ Z|θ ≤ n}. Notice that p sjk(ω)∑
k′∈K sjk′ (ω)
q can be either 1
or 0, depending on whether household j lives in location k or not.
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respectively. The rents are collected and consumed by an absentee landlord
L who owns all the housing and whose utility is uL((sLk)k∈K , zL) = zL in
all states.7 We assume that the landlord is risk neutral. The landlord is
absentee in that he/she has no private information about and does not care
about the state (in terms of his/her utility function), but the landlord does
care about rent collection. The landlord is endowed with an inelastic supply
of housing in all locations.
Since there are the same number of households and locations, from Wal-
ras’ Law and strict monotonicity of utility, each location is occupied by one
and only one household in equilibrium. Since P ∗k (ω) is determined by bid
rents of households living in k and since there is only one household living in
k in equilibrium in state ω, ω ∈ Ω, P ∗k (ω) is determined by only the house-
hold with kj(ω) = k. In this case, it is not reasonable to adopt standard
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept for the reasons discussed in
the Introduction.
Therefore, a household can augment their private information by and only
by using the information conveyed by equilibrium prices except the price in
his/her equilibrium location. When households condition their expectations
on additional market variables, the equilibrium concept is defined as a gen-
eralized rational expectations equilibrium; see Allen (1998). We leave to
future research the role of other market variables, such as who lives where
in equilibrium, in conveying information. But generically, who lives where is
captured in equilibrium prices.
Denote by P ∗ an equilibrium price function. Since P ∗k is determined
only by the households living in k in equilibrium, and since there is only one
household living in each location in equilibrium, it is reasonable in urban eco-
nomics to require that households maximize their utility given the informa-
7The existence of an absentee landlord is a standard assumption in urban economics
that makes our examples simpler. However, it is unnecessary for the existence of a MREE
and will be removed in Section 4.
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tion Fj∨σ(P ∗−kj), where σ(P ∗−kj) denotes the sigma algebra generated by P ∗−kj
(i.e., the sigma algebra of the inverse image of P ∗−kj),
8 rather than given the
information Fj ∨σ(P ∗) as assumed in standard rational expectations equilib-
rium. Denote by F ≡ ∨j∈NFj all households’ information. Letting µ denote a
probability measure defined on (Ω,F), then E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)] ≡∑
ω∈Ω uj(ψj(ω), ω) µ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)) is household j’s expected utility of
choosing ψj, based on j’s private information and the information given by
P ∗−kj . Since µ is common to agents, we eliminate sets of measure 0. The
concept of MREE is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A modified rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) is de-
fined as an equivalence class of F-measurable price functions P ∗ : Ω→ R2n+ ,
and for each j ∈ N , a Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)-measurable allocation function ψ∗j : Ω→⋃
k∈K R2+ such that
(i) P ∗k (ω) · ψ∗jk(ω) ≤ Yj − Tk for every ω ∈ Ω;
(ii) If ψ′j : Ω →
⋃
k∈K R2+ satisfies the informational constraint that ψ
′
j is
Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)-measurable and the budget constraint P ∗k (ω) ·ψ′jk(ω) ≤ Yj − Tk,
∀k ∈ K, for every ω ∈ Ω, then ∀j ∈ N ,
E[uj(ψ
′
j(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)] ≤ E[uj(ψ∗j(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj)];
(iii)
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N z
∗
jk(ω) + z
∗
L(ω) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈Np
s∗jk(ω)∑
k′∈K s
∗
jk′ (ω)
q Tk =
∑
j∈N Yj,∑
j∈N s
∗
jk(ω) = s¯k, and for each j, ψ
∗
jk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ψ∗jk′(ω) =
0, ∀k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
Condition (i) says that the budget constraint holds for every state that
can happen with a positive probability. Condition (ii) represents maximiza-
tion of expected utility subject to the budget. Condition (iii) represents
material balance and restricts each consumer to own housing in one and only
one location. This is the minimal perturbation of the standard general equi-
librium model necessary to make it compatible with urban economics, i.e.,
it is the standard general equilibrium model with the standard assumption
8Following Aumann (1976), the join Fj ∨ σ(P ∗−kj ) denotes the coarsest common refine-
ment of Fj and σ(P
∗
−kj )
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in urban economics that restricts each consumer to consume housing in one
and only one location, and can learn from the prices in all but his/her equi-
librium location.9 In what follows, we will introduce and solve for a bid rent
equilibrium with uncertainty, which is equivalent to a MREE (see Lemma
1 below). This device is common in urban economics, and is used “almost
everywhere.”
Given a vector of households’ utility levels in state ω, u(ω) ≡ (uj(ω))j∈N ,
bid rent Ψjk(uj(ω), ω) is the maximum rent per unit of housing that the
household j is willing to pay for residing in k in state ω while enjoying a given
utility level uj(ω), j ∈ N , k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. Next we define the vector Ψ∗k(ω) to
be the maximal bid rent at state ω in location k, Ψ∗(ω) to be the vector of all
such bid rents across locations, and Ψ∗−k(ω) to be the vector of all such bid
rents across locations other than location k. For a given example u∗(ω) ≡
(u∗j(ω))j∈N , denoting Ψ
∗(ω) ≡ (Ψ∗k(ω))k∈K and Ψ∗−k(ω) ≡ (Ψ∗k′(ω))k′∈K\{k},
where Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)}, then households form
expected utilities based on private information and the information revealed
by Ψ∗−k; however, Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω) is determined by households’ optimization.
Given u∗ : Ω → Rn+ and Ψ∗ : Ω → Rn+, mappings from the state space to
the utility and the bid rent space, respectively, and denoting Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω) ≡
maxψjk(ω){Yj−Tk−zjk(ω)sjk(ω) |E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj∨σ(Ψ∗−k)] = u∗j(ω)}, a bid rent equi-
librium is constituted when the given mappings u∗, Ψ∗ and the corresponding
Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω) are consistent in that Ψ
∗
k(ω) = maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)}, ∀k ∈ K,
ω ∈ Ω.10 When we solve the maximization problem defining Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω),
we obtain the optimal lot size Sjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω). Comparing this with ψjk(ω) ≡
(sjk(ω), zjk(ω)) in a standard utility-maximization problem, here we denote
9An alternative way to deal with information in this setting would be to assume that
the price of land at location k is measurable with respect to the initial information of
the resident agent, and let agents condition on all prices. This will not work, as demand
must be well-defined outside of equilibrium, for example, when 2 agents choose the same
location.
10It is possible that sjk(ω) = 0. For further discussion about handling boundaries in
the definition of bid rent, see Berliant and Zenou (forthcoming).
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ϕjk(uj(ω), ω) ≡ (Sjk(uj(ω), ω), Zjk(uj(ω), ω)) to be the optimal consump-
tions (arg max) in a bid-maximization problem. It can be checked that
Sjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω) = sjk(ω) when Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω) = pk(ω) and u
∗
j(ω) = ujk(ψjk(ω)).
Furthermore, recall again that in Lemma 1, we will show that the equilibrium
solutions of these two maximization problems are exactly the same. Given
u∗, for notational convenience, also denote S∗jk(ω) ≡ Sjk(u∗j(ω), ω), Z∗jk(ω) ≡
Zjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω)), ϕ
∗
jk(ω) ≡ (S∗jk(ω), Z∗jk(ω)), and ϕ∗j(ω) ≡ (ϕ∗jk(ω))k∈K .
Definition 2 A bid rent equilibrium is defined by a F-measurable house price
function Ψ∗ : Ω→ Rn+, and for each j ∈ N , a Fj∨σ(Ψ∗−kj)-measurable utility
function u∗j : Ω→ R+ such that for each location k ∈ K, for every ω ∈ Ω:
Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = max
j
{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)}; (2)
ϕ∗jk(ω) ≡ ϕjk(u∗j(ω), ω)
=

arg maxψjk(ω){Yj−Tk−zjk(ω)sjk(ω)
∣∣E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗−kj)] = u∗j(ω)}
if j ∈ arg maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)},
(0, 0) if j /∈ arg maxj{Ψjk(u∗j(ω), ω)};
(3)∑
j∈N
S∗jk(ω) = s¯k,
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
Z∗jk(ω) + z
∗
L(ω) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
p
S∗jk(ω)∑
k′∈K S
∗
jk′(ω)
q Tk =
∑
j∈N
Yj,
and ϕ∗jk(ω) 6= 0 implies that ϕ∗jk′(ω) = 0, ∀k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k,∀j ∈ N. (4)
Here, condition (2) says that the equilibrium housing price in every loca-
tion is determined by the highest bid rent among households for the housing
there. Condition (3) says that the equilibrium consumption of the household
who lives in k maximizes that household’s bid rent in k, given his private
information and the information revealed by equilibrium prices. Again, con-
dition (4) represents material balance and the standard urban economics
assumption that each consumer lives in one and only one location.
Since each household can consume housing in at most one location, the
consumption set is
⋃
k∈K R2+, and the ex post state-dependent preferences of
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living in k, k ∈ K, can be specified by utilities ujk : Ωk → κjk, where κjk is
a compact subset of Cr(R2+,R), r ≥ 2, endowed with the weak Cr compact-
open topology. Assume that for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, ujk(ϕ, ω) ∈ κjk
satisfies for each ϕ ∈ R2+:
(a) strict (differentiable) monotonicity: Dϕujk(ϕ, ω) ∈ R++,
(b) strict (differentiable) concavity: Dϕϕujk(ϕ, ω) is negative definite, and
(c) smooth boundary condition: the closure in R2 of the upper contour set
{ϕ′ ∈ R2++|ujk(ϕ′, ω) ≥ ujk(ϕ, ω)} is contained in R2++.
These conditions ensure that every household’s state-dependent preferences
are smooth in the sense of Debreu (1972) so that, conditional on any state
with a positive probability, demands are well defined Cr−1 functions. Our
examples satisfy these assumptions.
Although it is well-known that bid-rent and competitive equilibria are
closely connected (see for example Fujita, 1989), results in the literature
cover only the context of no uncertainty. If the MREE were known to be
fully revealing, this result could be applied state by state. We require an
equivalence result in the context of uncertainty, especially when the MREE
might not be fully revealing. The proof uses classical duality.
Lemma 1 Given that all households’ preferences are representable by a util-
ity function satisfying conditions (a), (b), and (c), (Ψ∗(ω), u∗(ω)) constitutes
a bid rent equilibrium if and only if the corresponding (Ψ∗(ω), (ϕ∗j(ω))j∈N)
constitutes a modified rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive econ-
omy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3 The Examples
Before stating formally and proving the results, to illustrate the non-existence
of fully revealing MREE, let us examine a few examples. In the first example,
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one of the households is fully informed, whereas the other has no informa-
tion. In the second example, both households have partial information about
the states of nature in different locations. In both examples, the equilibrium
prices are the same in different states, and hence illustrate an economy where
the MREE do not fully reveal the private information of households. Exam-
ples similar to these appear in the literature on rational expectations in the
standard general equilibrium model, i.e., Allen (1981), though in that litera-
ture they belong to the complement of a generic set, and have a very different
flavor. The idea behind Example 1 comes from the examples in Kreps (1977),
Jordan and Radner (1979), and Allen (1984).
3.1 Example 1
Suppose that there are two households (j ∈ {1, 2}) with the same income
(Y1 = Y2 = Y ), and two locations (k ∈ {x, y}) with land endowments x¯
and y¯, respectively. Household 1’s utility is state-dependent but the utility
function of household 2 is independent of states. In each location k, there
are two states (Low and High) denoted by ωk ∈ Ωk ≡ {L,H}, k ∈ {x, y},
which are equally likely to occur and the states in different locations are
not correlated. What each agent can observe are events that are subsets
of Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy. Denote ω ≡ ωx × ωy as an element of Ω. Furthermore,
household 1 has no information, and household 2 knows what the state will
be. That is, households’ information is represented respectively by F1 =
{φ,Ωx} × {φ,Ωy}, F2 = {φ, {H}, {L},Ωx} × {φ, {H}, {L},Ωy} which are
sub-σ-fields of F , where F ≡ F1∨F2 = F2. Everything except the true state
is common knowledge, so households are assumed to know the relationship
between states and prices.
Given information structure F1, the state variable in household 1’s alloca-
tion can be ignored for simplicity until he/she learns something. Utilities will
be Cobb-Douglas. The optimization problem for household 1 is to maximize
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expected utility subject to the budget constraint:
max
s1x,s1y ,z1x,z1y
Eu1(s1x, s1y, z1x, z1y|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], E[βω1 ln(s1y) + ln(z1y)|F1]}
s.t. px(ω)s1x + py(ω)s1y + z1x + z1y + p
s1y
s1x + s1y
q t ≤ Y,
s1k s1l = 0, s1k z1l = 0, z1k z1l = 0,
s1k, z1k ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l,
where αω1 , β
ω
1 ∈ R++. In contrast, since household 2’s utility is state-independent,
his/her optimization problem is, for ω ∈ Ω,
max
s2x(ω),s2y(ω),z2x(ω),z2y(ω)
u2(s2x(ω), s2y(ω), z2x(ω), z2y(ω), ω)
= max{α2 ln(s2x(ω)) + ln(z2x(ω)), β2 ln(s2y(ω)) + ln(z2y(ω))}
s.t. px(ω)s2x(ω) + py(ω)s2y(ω) + z2x(ω) + z2y(ω)
+p s2y(ω)
s2x(ω) + s2y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s2k(ω) s2l(ω) = 0, s2k(ω) z2l(ω) = 0, z2k(ω) z2l(ω) = 0,
s2k(ω),z2k(ω) ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l,
where α2, β2 ∈ R++. Suppose that on average household 1 likes the housing
in the CBD (x) more than household 2, and household 2 prefers y more than
household 1, i.e., E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[β
ω
1 ] < β2.
Following Alonso (1964), Fujita (1989), and our Lemma 1, people live
where their bid rents are maximal in equilibrium, and these bid rents consti-
tute equilibrium rents. The bid rent functions of the two households for the
housing in x and y are
Ψ1x(Eu1, ω) = max
s1x
Y − eEu1(s1x)−E[αω1 ]
s1x
, (5)
Ψ1y(Eu1, ω) = max
s1y
Y − t− eEu1(s1y)−E[βω1 ]
s1y
, (6)
Ψ2x(u2(ω), ω) = max
s2x(ω)
Y − eu2(ω)(s2x(ω))−α2
s2x(ω)
, (7)
Ψ2y(u2(ω), ω) = max
s2y(ω)
Y − t− eu2(ω)(s2y(ω))−β2
s2y(ω)
, (8)
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where ω ∈ Ω. From first and second-order conditions, the optimal land lot
sizes for households are
S∗1x(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y
]
1
E[αω1 ] , (9)
S∗1y(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[βω1 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω1 ] , (10)
S∗2x(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + α2)
Y
]
1
α2 , (11)
S∗2y(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + β2)
Y − t ]
1
β2 . (12)
Since households 1 and 2 prefer to live at x and y, respectively, from market
clearing conditions, S∗1x(ω) = x¯ and S
∗
2y(ω) = y¯, ∀ω ∈ Ω, we have
Eu∗1 = ln[Y ] + E[α
ω
1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], (13)
u∗2(ω) = ln[Y − t] + β2 ln[y¯]− ln[1 + β2], (14)
for ω ∈ Ω. So the equilibrium bid rents of agents in the two locations in the
two states are
Ψ∗1x(ω) =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯
, (15)
Ψ∗1y(ω) = (1 + E[α
ω
1 ])
1
E[βω1 ]E[βω1 ](x¯
E[αω1 ]Y )
−1
E[βω1 ]
(
Y − t
1 + E[βω1 ]
)1+ 1
E[βω1 ]
, (16)
Ψ∗2x(ω) = (1 + β2)
1
α2α2[y¯
β2(Y − t)]−1α2
(
Y
1 + α2
)1+ 1
α2
, (17)
Ψ∗2y(ω) =
β2
1 + β2
Y − t
y¯
, (18)
for ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are presented in Figure 1, where the
horizontal axis represents the location whereas the vertical axis represents
the individuals’ bid rents.11
Choosing parameters satisfying Ψ∗1x(ω) > Ψ
∗
2x(ω) and Ψ
∗
2y(ω) > Ψ
∗
1y(ω),
∀ω ∈ Ω, the bid rent of household 1 for the housing in x (y) is higher (lower)
11If we used Definition 1 rather than Definition 2 for the examples, although they are
equivalent by Lemma 1, we could not draw the figures.
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-Ψ∗1k(HH)
Ψ∗1k(LL)
Ψ∗2k(ω)
x
CBD
y
t
Ψ∗
Figure 1: The bid rent functions in Example 1, where the dotted lines
represent Ψ∗1k(HL) and Ψ
∗
1k(LH), respectively.
than that of household 2 for the housing in x (y) in all states.12 That is, the
equilibrium location pattern where household 1 lives at x and household 2
lives in y is verified for some parameters.
Notice that there is no equilibrium that fully reveals information. Suppose
there is a fully revealing MREE, that is, Ψ∗x(HH) = Ψ
∗
x(HL) 6= Ψ∗x(LH) =
Ψ∗x(LL) in equilibrium. Since Ψ
∗
y(ω) is a constant for all ω ∈ Ω, different
valuations of household 1 for the housing in x in different states conflict with
the assumption that household 1 has no information about the state in x.
Notice also that Ψ∗x(ω) and Ψ
∗
y(ω) depend only on the mean of α1, β2, and the
values of Y , t, x¯, and y¯. Therefore, the equilibrium rents in the two locations
are independent of the realized state, and thus, there exists no fully-revealing
MREE. Even though household 2 knows the state, since household 2 doesn’t
care about the state, equilibrium prices don’t reveal household 2’s private
12For example, for Y = 20, t = 1, α2 = 1, E[β
ω
1 ] = 1, β2 = 2, x¯ = 10, and y¯ = 10, it
can be checked that ∀E[αω1 ] > 1, Ψ∗1x(ω) > Ψ∗2x(ω) and Ψ∗2y(ω) > Ψ∗1y(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
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information.
Notice that for this example as well as the next, knowledge of other market
variables, such as who lives in which location, has no effect on information
revelation in equilibrium.
3.2 Example 2
Follow the same setting as in the previous example, but suppose that house-
hold 1 knows the state in location y and has no information about location
x. On the other hand, household 2 knows only the state in x, but not
the state in y. Let Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy, where Ωx = Ωy ≡ {H,L} represent
the state spaces in locations x and y. F1 = {φ,Ωx} × {φ,Ωy, {H}, {L}},
F2 = {φ,Ωx, {H}, {L}} × {φ,Ωy} ⊆ F are sub-σ-fields representing house-
holds’ private information. Again, the relationship between states and prices
is common knowledge.
Each household lives in one and only one location. Moreover, households
make their decisions simultaneously. Given an event ω ∈ Ω, both households’
utilities are state-dependent, so their optimization problems are
max
s1x,s1y(ω),z1x,z1y(ω)
Eu1(s1x, s1y(ω), z1x, z1y(ω)|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], βω1 ln(s1y(ω)) + ln(z1y(ω))}
s.t. px(ω)s1x + py(ω)s1y(ω) + z1x + z1y(ω) + p
s1y(ω)
s1x(ω) + s1y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s1x s1y(ω) = 0, s1x z1y(ω) = 0, z1x s1y(ω) = 0, z1x z1y(ω) = 0,
s1x,s1y(ω), z1x, z1y(ω) ≥ 0;
max
s2x(ω),s2y ,z2x(ω),z2y
Eu2(s2x(ω), s2y, z2x(ω), z2y|F2)
= max{αω2 ln(s2x(ω)) + ln(z2x(ω)), E[βω2 ln(s2y) + ln(z2y)|F2]}
s.t. px(ω)s2x(ω) + py(ω)s2y + z2x(ω) + z2y + p
s2y(ω)
s2x(ω) + s2y(ω)
q t ≤ Y,
s2x(ω) s2y = 0, s2x(ω) z2y = 0, z2x(ω) s2y = 0, z2x(ω) z2y = 0,
s2x(ω),s2y, z2x(ω), z2y ≥ 0;
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Note that, in fact, the optimized utility of household 1 is state-dependent at
y, denoted by u∗1y(ω), and state-independent at x, denoted by Eu
∗
1x; u
∗
2x(ω)
and Eu∗2y are similarly defined. To present a MREE without revelation of
private information, suppose that E[αω1 ] > α
ω
2 and E[β
ω
2 ] > β
ω
1 , for all ω ∈ Ω.
Given these conditions, suppose that households 1 and 2 choose to live in
locations x and y, respectively. Their bid rent functions are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
Ψ1x(Eu1, ω) = max
s1x
Y − eEu1s−E[αω1 ]1x
s1x
, (19)
Ψ1y(u1(ω), ω) = max
s1y
Y − t− eu1(ω)s−βω11y
s1y
, (20)
Ψ2x(u2(ω), ω) = max
s2x
Y − eu2(ω)s−αω22x
s2x
, (21)
Ψ2y(Eu2, ω) = max
s2y
Y − t− eEu2s−E[βω2 ]2y
s2y
. (22)
Thus, the optimal lot sizes for household 1 and 2 are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
S∗1x(Eu1, ω) = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y
]
1
E[αω1 ] , (23)
S∗1y(u1(ω), ω) = [
eu1(ω)(1 + βω1 )
Y − t ]
1
βω1 , (24)
S∗2x(u2(ω), ω) = [
eu2(ω)(1 + αω2 )
Y
]
1
αω2 , (25)
S∗2y(Eu2, ω) = [
eEu2(1 + E[βω2 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω2 ] . (26)
From S∗1x(ω) = x¯ and S
∗
2y(ω) = y¯, ∀ω ∈ Ω, we have
Eu∗1(·|F1) = ln[Y ] + E[αω1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], (27)
Eu∗2(·|F2) = ln[Y − t] + E[βω2 ] ln[y¯]− ln[1 + E[βω2 ]]. (28)
Again, households’ equilibrium bid rents are
Ψ∗1x(ω) =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯
, (29)
Ψ∗1y(ω) = (1 + E[α
ω
1 ])
1
βω1 βω1 (x¯
E[αω1 ]Y )
−1
βω1
(
Y − t
1 + βω1
)1+ 1
βω1
, (30)
Ψ∗2x(ω) = (1 + E[β
ω
2 ])
1
αω2 αω2 [y¯
E[βω2 ](Y − t)]
−1
αω2
(
Y
1 + αω2
)1+ 1
αω2
, (31)
Ψ∗2y(ω) =
E[βω2 ]
1 + E[βω2 ]
Y − t
y¯
, (32)
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where ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are drawn in Figure 2, where the
horizontal axis represents the location, whereas the individual bid rents are
represented by the vertical axis.
-
Ψ∗1k(HH)
Ψ∗1k(LL)
Ψ∗2k(HH)
Ψ∗2k(LL)
x
CBD
y
t
Ψ∗
Figure 2: The bid rent functions in Example 2, where the dotted lines
represent Ψ∗1k(HL), Ψ
∗
1k(LH), Ψ
∗
2k(HL), and Ψ
∗
2k(LH), respectively.
Given parameters satisfying Ψ∗1x(ω) > Ψ
∗
2x(ω) and Ψ
∗
2y(ω) > Ψ
∗
1y(ω),
∀ω ∈ Ω, the bid rent of household 1 (household 2) for the housing in x (y)
is always higher than that of household 2 (household 1). So the equilibrium
location pattern where household 1 lives at x and household 2 lives at y is
verified.13
Again, there is no fully revealing equilibrium in this example. Since Ψ∗x
and Ψ∗y depend only on Y , t, the mean of the preference parameters and the
endowments of land in each location, the equilibrium bid rents are the same
13For example, for Y = 20, t = 1, αHH2 = α
HL
2 = 1.1, α
LH
2 = α
LL
2 = 1, β
HH
1 = β
LH
1 =
1.1, βHL1 = β
LL
1 = 1, E[β
ω
2 ] = 2, x¯ = 10, and y¯ = 10, it can be checked that ∀E[αω1 ] > 1,
Ψ∗1x(ω) > Ψ
∗
2x(ω) and Ψ
∗
2y(ω) > Ψ
∗
1y(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
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in all the realized states. That is, the mapping from prices to preferences is
not injective, so fully-revealing MREE does not exist.14
These examples illustrate different causes for the equilibrium not fully
revealing private information: The first example arises because the informed
household doesn’t care about different states. The second one arises due to
the mismatch between informed households and their equilibrium locations.
In the next section, we show that these unfortunate circumstances can persist
under small perturbations.
4 An Open Subset of Economies without Fully
Revealing Equilibria
The examples represent two points in the space of economies with no fully
revealing MREE. In this section, we generalize the examples and show that,
in economies under uncertainty where there is no market for contingent claims
or financial contracts, fully revealing MREE is not present for an open set
of economies. But for all parameters satisfying a condition, there exists a
MREE (that might not be fully revealing). This will be proved in the next
section.
Suppose there are two households (j ∈ N ≡ {1, 2}), and two locations
(k ∈ K ≡ {x, y}). Let Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy = {H,L} × {H,L} be the finite
payoff-relevant state space of the economy. For each state ω, the economy
(Y, uj(ψj(ω), ω)j∈N) is a smooth economy as defined by Debreu (1972). It is
important to notice that ujk is payoff-relevant to only Ωk; that is, we assume
that people living in location k care only about the state in k. Later, we
14In these two examples, each household has either full information or no informa-
tion about the state of a location. We can consider another example where each house-
hold has partial information about the state of a location, i.e., Ωx = Ωy = {H,M,L},
F1 = {φ, {H,M}, {L},Ωx} × {φ, {H}, {M,L},Ωy}, and F2 = {φ, {H}, {M,L},Ωx} ×
{φ, {H,M}, {L},Ωy}. Then if household 1 (2) lives in x (y) in equilibrium, except in state
LL, states of two locations are not fully revealed by equilibrium bid rents. So there does
not exist a fully revealing MREE.
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consider the perturbations that maintain this property.
Before we prove the results, some characteristics of equilibrium must be
defined. In a MREE, the information can be fully revealing, which means
that all households can learn the state of nature by observing the equilibrium
prices in all locations except their equilibrium locations and using their pri-
vate information. Alternatively, the information can be non-fully revealing in
a MREE, where at least one household cannot know the state of nature from
the equilibrium price and their private information. Their formal definitions
are as follows.
Definition 3 A fully-revealing modified rational expectations equilibrium is
a modified rational expectations equilibrium such that
Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗−kj) = F , ∀j ∈ N. (33)
When there is at least one j such that the above equality does not hold, we
say it is a non-fully-revealing modified rational expectations equilibrium.
In other words, conditioning on a fully revealing equilibrium price func-
tion is equivalent to knowing the pooled information of all households in the
economy. Though Allen (1981) proves the existence of an open and dense
subset of economies with fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in
the classical framework, when perturbations location-by-location are consid-
ered, Theorem 1 will show that the same statement does not hold for MREE
in urban economics. Utility functions defined location-by-location are for-
mally called local utilities.15 We have been using them in this paper up to
this point.
Definition 4 (Local Utilities)
Households’ preferences are called local when their preferences satisfy ∀j ∈
N, k ∈ K, ujk : Ωk → κjk. If for some j, k, there exists k′, k′ 6= k, k′ ∈ K,
such that ujk : Ωk × Ωk′ → κjk is not constant for some ωk′ , ω′k′ ∈ Ωk′, then
it is called non-local.
15Throughout this paper, only preference perturbations are considered since endowment
perturbations give households more information if they are state-dependent, and pertur-
bations of ex ante information are not smooth.
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That is, saying that utilities are local requires that each household’s util-
ity at location k is a function of only Ωk when they live in location k. We
shall require that when utility functions are perturbed, if they start local,
they remain local. We call this a “spatially local perturbation.” Spatially
local perturbation means that if people living in a location care only about
the state in the location where they live, then when their utility function is
perturbed, it continues to have this property. Spatially local perturbations
are more realistic than non-local perturbations in urban economics, since it is
not persuasive to say that the perturbed preferences conditional on residence
in location k depend on the state in another location. For example, when
preference perturbations are considered, in most cases, the state of commut-
ing congestion or crime (or the quality of schools) in Chicago is irrelevant
to that in New York. Therefore, in urban economics, it doesn’t make sense
to consider spatially non-local perturbations as used in standard models.
Throughout this paper, to highlight the distinct essence of urban economics,
we focus on spatially local perturbations.
It is possible to add other kinds of perturbations to the model, for example
national or regional uncertainty, but this would only complicate notation.
Theorem 1 Given the discrete state space Ω, consider local perturbations
of households’ preferences. There exists an open subset of economies that
possess no fully-revealing modified rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, if one household has information about a specific location, if it
doesn’t live there in equilibrium, the housing price in that location will not
reveal his information. If a household lives in the location about which he
is informed, there is an information gain (in that he can maximize ex post
utility instead of ex ante utility), but also a information spillover to all other
households in that they can learn private information about that location
by observing the equilibrium housing price. When local utility and spatially
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local perturbations are considered, the information spillover plays no role for
the households living in other locations. However, when spatially non-local
perturbations are considered, a small perturbation makes the states of all
locations relevant to the utility of living in k. So, as shown in Allen (1981),
there exists an open and dense set of economies possessing fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium.
Finally, we make a remark here: If there is no fully revealing MREE, an
equilibrium allocation can fail to be Pareto optimal. Consider a variation of
Example 1 shown in Figure 3. When probability is quite evenly distributed
over states in Ωk, k = 1, 2, household 1’s bid rent for the CBD is larger
than that of household 2, and household 2’s bid rent for location 2 is larger
than that of household 1. So in equilibrium, household j lives in location
j, j = 1, 2 in both states. However, in a Pareto optimum, household j lives
in 3 − j, j = 1, 2 when ω = LH. Therefore, we have an example with an
equilibrium allocation that is ex ante but not ex post efficient.
-
Ψ∗1(HH)
Ψ∗1(LL)
Ψ∗1(HL)
Ψ∗1(LH)
Ψ∗2(ω)
1
CBD
2
t
Ψ
Figure 3: The non-fully revealing MREE allocation can fail to be ex post
Pareto optimal.
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5 The Existence of Modified Rational Expec-
tations Equilibrium
After presenting an open subset of economies that possess non-fully-revealing
MREE, it is natural to ask: Can a MREE fail to exist in urban economies?
This can undermine the minimal requirement for further analysis in urban
economics with uncertainty. In this section, the existence of (not necessarily
fully-revealing) MREE is examined, given the assumption of ordered relative
steepness of bid-rents, to be defined shortly. Since an absentee landlord is
not needed here, we can assume that private ownership of land is distributed
among all households. Denoting ejk as household j’s land endowment in
location k, the results with no landlord are the same as the situation with an
absentee landlord, except that Yj =
∑
k∈K Ψ
∗
k(ω) ejk, where
∑
j∈N ejk = s¯k,
∀j ∈ N , k ∈ K. First we describe how the existence of equilibrium depends
on the number of locations relative to the number of households.
When the number of locations is greater than the number of households,
since each household can consume housing in at most one location, there must
exist at least one location where no household lives. In these abandoned
locations, by Walras’ Law, the price of housing is zero. Therefore, given
∀z¯ > 0, limsjk→∞ ujk((sjk, z¯), ω) = ∞, unless the commuting cost is very
high and these locations are far away from the CBD, households have an
incentive to move into these locations to enjoy a higher utility. In this case,
there is no equilibrium.
Under ordered steepness of bid rents, the ordering of households is inde-
pendent of state. When the number of locations is the same as the number
of households, the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents en-
sures that every location is occupied by exactly one household in equilibrium.
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Therefore, we can settle households one-by-one from the core to periphery
in the order of the slopes of their bid rents, constituting an equilibrium al-
location.16 Thus, we know ex ante what information will be revealed by
equilibrium prices, so we can add this information to the consumer’s opti-
mization problem. The case when the number of households is larger than
the number of locations is left to Section 5. This would be the case, for
example, if there were a continuum of consumers.
Suppose there are n households and n locations. Before proving a theorem
on the existence of equilibrium, we need to make the following assumptions on
households’ bid rents. These assumptions are standard in urban economies;
see for example Fujita (1985, 1989).17 To avoid abuse of notation, let s˜j(t, ω)
and z˜j(t, ω) denote the consumptions of lot size and composite good at a
distance t from the CBD in state ω. Given a specific state ω and a utility level
u, denote Ψ˜j(t, u, ω) ≡ maxs˜j(t,ω),z˜j(t,ω){Yj−t−z˜j(t,ω)s˜j(t,ω) |uj(t, ω) = u} as household
j’s bid rent for housing at distance t from the CBD.18
Assumption 1 (Ordered Relative Steepness of Bid Rent)
Households’ bid rent functions are ordered by their relative steepnesses. That
is, given j < j′ ≤ n, Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) is steeper than Ψ˜j′(t, uj′ , ω): Given ω ∈ Ω,
whenever Ψ˜j(t¯, uj, ω) = Ψ˜j′(t¯, uj′ , ω) > 0 for some t¯, uj and uj′, then
Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) > Ψ˜j′(t, uj′ , ω), ∀ 0 ≤ t < t¯, (34)
Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) < Ψ˜j′(t, uj′ , ω), ∀ t > t¯ wherever Ψ˜j(t, uj, ω) > 0. (35)
Notice that the ordering of households is independent of state. When
households have the same utility function but different incomes, and when
16Without the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents, we must find a fixed
point in the information structure, which is hard.
17In fact, in standard urban economies, the assumption of ordered relative steepness
relates only to the uniqueness of equilibrium and makes the proof of existence of equilib-
rium easier, but existence of equilibrium in urban economies can be proved without this
assumption when there is no uncertainty; see Fujita and Smith (1987).
18Notice that though locations are discrete points on the line representing distance to
the CBD, households’ bid rents are in fact continuous functions of the distance from the
CBD.
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housing is a normal good, ordered relative steepness of bid rents is naturally
satisfied.19 However, when households have different utilities, ordered relative
steepness of bid rent is not implied. The assumption of ordered relative
steepness of bid rents ensures that given arbitrary levels of utilities for two
agents, for each state, their bid rents must cross at (no more than) one point
as shown in Figure 4, where the bid rent curves shift down as the utility
levels increase. For example, the Cobb-Douglas utilities in Examples 1 and
2 satisfy the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents, and so
do quasi-linear utilities. In what follows, we prove the existence of MREE,
given the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents.
-
Ψ˜1(t, u, ω)
Ψ˜2(t, u, ω)
CBD
t
Ψ˜j
Figure 4: Example where households’ bid rents satisfy ordered relative
steepness of bid rents.
19See Fujita (1989), pages 28-29.
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5.1 When households are insensitive
To begin, given ordered steepness of bid rents and the same number of con-
sumers and locations, use Assumption 1 to order consumers so that consumer
1 has the steepest bid rent, consumer 2 the next steepest, and so forth. Since
the examples in Section 2 highlight the condition required for the existence
of non-fully revealing MREE, in what follows we focus on the case where
households present insensitivity. Recall that the utility of household j in
state ω from living in location j is denoted by ujj(ψjj(ω), ω).
Definition 5 (Insensitivity)
There exist states (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω×Ω that for each household j ∈ N such that ω
and ω′ are in different partition elements of Fj,20
Dsjj(ω)ujj(ψjj(ω), ω)
Dzjj(ω)ujj(ψjj(ω), ω)
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗jj(ω)
=
Dsjj(ω′)ujj(ψjj(ω
′), ω′)
Dzjj(ω′)ujj(ψjj(ω
′), ω′)
∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗jj(ω′)
, (36)
but there exists j′ ∈ N for whom ω and ω′ are in the same element of Fj′
and u∗j′j′(ψjj(ω), ω) 6= u∗j′j′(ψjj(ω′), ω′).
Given that housing is a normal good, we will show that equilibrium always
exists and that insensitivity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a non-fully revealing MREE.
The intuition for the first part of the definition of insensitivity is that
for any household who has information in distinguishing two states, his/her
marginal rate of substitution in k is independent of these realized states.
However, to ensure that the household’s information is not trivial, we need
the second part of the definition which implies that his/her information about
location k does matter for another household. Insensitivity can result from
one or more of several sources: utility could be quasi-linear, or information
about conditions in one location can be irrelevant to the consumer living
there, or some information is irrelevant to all consumers.
20States that nobody can distinguish and that do not matter to anyone can be combined.
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Let P(Ω) be the power set of Ω. Now, consider a public partitional
information function I : Ω → P(Ω)\{φ} such that for every ω ∈ Ω, a
nonempty subset I(ω) of Ω is assigned, where: (1) for every ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ I(ω);
(2) ω′ ∈ I(ω) implies I(ω′) = I(ω). Moreover, for every (ω, ω′) satisfying
insensitivity, I(ω′) = I(ω). This condition implies that when ω and ω′ are
insensitive, and ω′ and ω′′ are insensitive, then I(ω) = I(ω′) = I(ω′′). So it
can be checked that
I(ω) = {ω′∣∣I(ω′) = I(ω)} (37)
In other words, I(ω) is a partition element collecting states that are di-
rectly or transitively insensitive with ω. Intuitively, for all states in I(ω),
either households have no information to distinguish them, or the informed
household cannot reflect its information by differences in its marginal rate of
substitution. The non-fully revealing MREE is supported by the σ-algebra
generated by the public partitional information function.
Theorem 2 Given Assumption 1 and that housing consumption is a normal
good, under insensitivity, for j ∈ N , there is a σ(I)-measurable bid rent
function Ψ∗ : Ω → R2n+ and Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗−j)-measurable consumption functions
ϕ∗j : Ω → ∪k∈KR2+ that constitute a unique non-fully revealing MREE such
that, for k ∈ K,
Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψkk(u∗k(ω), ω)
= max
skk(ω),zkk(ω)
{Yj − Tk − zkk(ω)
skk(ω)
∣∣∣E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗−k)] = u∗k(ω)};
(38)
ϕ∗jk(ω) ≡ ϕjk(u∗k(ω), ω) =
(s¯k, Yj − Tk −Ψ∗k(ω) s¯k), if j = k,(0, 0), if j 6= k; (39)
and the unique equilibrium utility level u∗k(ω), k ∈ K, satisfies
Ψkk(u
∗
k(ω), ω) =
Dskk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗−k)]
Dzkk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗−k)]
∣∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
. (40)
Proof. See Appendix C.
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5.2 When households are not insensitive
Insensitivity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a non-fully reveal-
ing MREE. Since, with insensitivity, there is some useful information that
is not transmitted from informed to uninformed households, the MREE is
non-fully revealing. Let σ˜k ≡ σ(Ωk)×(×k′ 6=k{φ,Ωk′}), which is the σ-algebra
indicating that only the state in k is known, whereas all states in other lo-
cations are completely unknown. Without insensitivity, the equilibrium can
only be fully-revealing.
Theorem 3 Given Assumption 1 and housing consumption is a normal
good, under no insensitivity, there exists a unique modified rational expec-
tations equilibrium, and it is fully revealing.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In the literature, an open and dense subset of standard economies with
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is found. However, under
the natural assumption of spatially local perturbations of utility functions,
as shown in the previous section, an open subset of economies with only a
non-fully revealing equilibrium is found. Recall that, consistent with what is
shown in standard general equilibrium models, there is also an open subset
of urban economies with only fully revealing equilibria: The easiest way to
present this is to exchange the information given to households 1 and 2 in
our examples and use spatially local perturbations of utility functions. Then
within these perturbations, the MREE can only be fully revealing (since
there is no mismatch between the information known by households and
their locations). Therefore, neither the set of fully revealing nor the set
of non-fully revealing economies can be dense under the structure of urban
economics. Non-fully revealing equilibrium is more interesting in highlighting
the potential positive value and the strategic use of information. When non-
local perturbations are considered, though they are not so reasonable in
urban economics, the results are the same as the ones in standard general
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equilibrium models. That is, there is an open and dense subset of economies
that possess a fully revealing MREE.
As shown in the comparison in Table 1, the inefficiency in information
transmission in a housing/land market rests on two key assumptions: spa-
tially local utility perturbations and the standard setting in urban economics
that every household can consume housing in only one place. When either
of them is violated, the result in standard models is restored. That is, in
economic circumstances where there is no location structure or no spatially
local property of utility, generically, the efficiency of prices in information
transmission is attained even in a (modified) rational expectations equilib-
rium. We conclude that geographic structure, together with spatially local
utility properties, can play a role in distorting the efficiency of the market in
transmitting information from informed to uninformed households.
Households can consume Ordinary consumption set
housing in only one place
Spatially local Open subsets of economies An open and dense subset
utility with fully revealing and of economies with fully
perturbations non-fully revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
(Urban economics)
Spatially An open and dense subset An open and dense subset
non-local of economies with fully of economies with fully
utility revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
perturbations (Standard model)
Table 1: A comparison of the results in this paper with the results in the
literature.
If households can be redistributed so that location is coincident with in-
formation, then we can create a fully-revealing MREE. However, this idea
seems impractical since in most cases, unless the households are very risk
averse, households’ subjective preferences for location do not necessarily de-
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pend on the information that they have.
6 The Open-City Model
The model developed in the previous sections is, in practice, an assignment
model; that is, only one household is allowed to reside in each location.
An open-city model allows us to depart from this restriction. Although
each household must reside in only one location, the location is no longer
indivisible in that many households can reside in the same location. In
order to allow more consumers than the number of locations, a continuum
of consumers of a finite number (m) of types is considered in the open-
city model, m ≥ 2, where each type of household is indexed by j ∈ M ≡
{1, ...,m}. Households of the same type have the same gross income Yj,
j ∈ M , the same information, and the same preference for housing and
composite good. Moreover, bid rent functions of different types of households
are ordered by their relative steepnesses such that type 1 (m) households have
the steepest (flattest) bid rent curves, as defined in Assumption 1.
Assume that there are a large number of outside cities and, following Hen-
derson (1974), Henderson and Abdel-Rahman (1991), Abdel-Rahman (1996),
Anas and Xiong (2003), and Anas (2004), all cities are ex ante identical.
Moreover, there is no aggregate uncertainty among outside cities. Thus, the
utility for type j households from living in an outside city is a constant u¯j > 0.
Locations are indexed by k ∈ K ≡ {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, in the representative
city that we are analyzing. For the generic existence of equilibrium, it is as-
sumed that m ≤ n. Each location k is endowed with an inelastic land supply
s¯k and a random variable ωk, k ∈ K. Let ω ≡ (ωk)k∈K ∈ Ω represent the
states of all locations. Assume that households are costlessly mobile. That
is, each type of household can costlessly migrate into and out of any location
in the representative and outside cities. Following the literature on open-city
models, the utility levels of households are exogenously given in the range
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so that equilibrium always exists and the city populations are endogenous.21
Denoting N∗jk(ω) as the equilibrium population of type j households living
in k, N∗jk(ω) is endogenously determined by the equilibrium bid rent and the
land supply in k, k ∈ K, j ∈M , ω ∈ Ω.
Given these assumptions, one location is occupied by more than one
household, and can be occupied by more than one type. The definition
of a bid rent equilibrium in the open-city model is the same as Definition 2
except that u∗j(ω) = u¯j, ∀ω ∈ Ω, and the information that is conveyed by
prices is specified as follows.
Though many real-world economic phenomena appear to hinge critically
on the process of asymmetric information revelation in equilibrium,22 as em-
phasized in Ausubel (1990) and Allen and Jordan (1998), it is very difficult
to obtain a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium. The reason
is the informational discontinuity in households’ demand invalidates the use
of a fixed-point argument when the existence of equilibrium is demonstrated.
In the literature, the existence of partially revealing equilibria generally de-
pends on some form of approximation, either to exact market clearing or to
complete rationality in agents’ use of information. Here, on the other hand,
we use no approximation but a version of MREE generalized according to the
characteristics of urban economies. The MREE concept given in Definition 1
21There is in practice a system of cities behind our open-city model. In the systems-
of-cities literature, total (national) population is exogenous and both the number of cities
and city populations are endogenous. Following Henderson (1974), given that there is only
one type of city, in equilibrium cities are identical except for the realized states. The cities
can be set up by developers, as in Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1993) and Anas (2004), or
they can be self-organized, as in Henderson (1974), Henderson and Abdel-Rahman (1991),
Anas (1992), Henderson and Becker (2000), and Pines (2000).
Following the literature of representative cities, we focus on symmetric equilibria where
households of the same type get the same ex ante utility level in all cities. Utility levels
for all types are endogenous shadow prices corresponding to the number of cities and city
populations. To get city population for each type and the number of cities to match the
national population in a symmetric equilibrium, we can adjust utility levels and find a
fixed point (u¯j)j∈M where all the population fits and land markets clear.
22For example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) show that if information can be freely
conveyed by prices, no trader would have an incentive to collect costly information.
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is fine in the open city model as long as, for each location, the same type lives
there in all states. However, if the type who lives in a location changes with
the state, it is not clear what information households can condition on for
that location. To solve this problem, we encapsulate a multi-stage learning
process in “test prices” when the MREE concept is defined for the open city
model. This learning process postulates a selection of equilibrium which is
reasonable in urban economics.
Since utility levels are fixed in all states, we can proceed to analyze each
location independently. Fixing any location, for each state, first we take ev-
ery person’s information to be their private information and find the “test”
equilibrium price or maximal bid rent based on it. (Due to a lack of full in-
formation, some test prices will be the same in different states.) Next, after
adding the information conveyed by these test prices to each person’s infor-
mation, we compute again new test prices. Repeating this process, at each
step every household’s information is getting weakly better in that his/her
sigma algebra does not get smaller. Eventually, the process stops when the
renewed test price function becomes measurable in all households’ sigma al-
gebra obtained in the previous step, which means no household can further
augment his/her information from observing test prices. Since any price
function is measurable in full information (the finest sigma algebra), given
a finite state space, this process must terminate in a finite number of steps.
The information augmentation process and the MREE are formally defined
as follows.
Definition 6 (Modified Rational Expectations Equilibrium in the
Open City Model)
For each k ∈ K, consider a finite sequence of test bid rent functions, (Ψ(i)k )i=0,1,...,I ,
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satisfying the following conditions:
Ψ
(0)
k (ω) = max
j∈M
Ψ
(0)
jk (u¯j, ω), where
Ψ
(0)
jk (u¯j, ω) = max
sjk(ω),zjk(ω)
{
Yj − Tk − zjk(ω)
sjk(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)∣∣∣Fj] = u¯j
}
;
(41)
For i > 0, Ψ
(i)
k (ω) = max
j∈M
Ψ
(i)
jk (u¯j, ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω, where
Ψ
(i)
jk (u¯j, ω) = max
sjk(ω),zjk(ω)
{
Yj − Tk − zjk(ω)
sjk(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣E[uj(ψj(ω), ω)∣∣∣
( ∨
τ=0,1,...,i−1
σ(Ψ
(τ)
k )
)
∨ Fj] = u¯j
}
;
(42)
Ψ
(I)
k (ω) is
( ∨
τ=0,1,...,I
σ(Ψ
(τ)
k )
)
∨ Fj −measurable, ∀j ∈M, and
Ψ
(i)
k (ω) is not
( ∨
τ=0,1,...,i
σ(Ψ
(τ)
k )
)
∨ Fj −measurable for at least one j ∈M,
∀i = 1, ..., I − 1. (43)
Notice that the MREE concept in the open city model reduces to the
previous definition in the assignment model where the locations of consumers
are state-independent, as in the assignment model under Assumption 1. In
this case, I = 2, because the private information of consumers living at k is
reflected in step i = 1. When I > 1,
∨
τ=0,1,...,i−1σ(Ψ
(τ)
k ) represents type j
households’ extra information augmented from observing test prices before
step i, i = 1, ..., I.23
For each location k ∈ K, letting I(k) be the smallest positive number
of steps such that Ψ
(I(k))
k (ω) is measurable in
(∨
τ=0,1,...,I(k)−1σ(Ψ
(τ)
k )
)
∨ Fj,
∀j ∈ M , then I = max{I(k)}k∈K . With the help of an open city model
framework, Theorem 4 shows that even if the location is not indivisible,
there is an open subset of economies that possess no fully revealing MREE.
23Notice that outside the case I = 2, the equilibrium information structure might not be
Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗−k). Moreover, the equilibria of the assignment model and the open city model
can be different because the setups of the two models are different.
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Theorem 4 In the open city model, given Assumption 1, the modified ra-
tional expectations equilibrium always exists and is unique. Furthermore,
there exists an open subset of economies where the unique modified rational
expectations equilibrium is not fully revealing.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 4 shows that when the location is no longer indivisible in that
multiple households (that are of the same type or different types) can reside
in the same location, there still exists an open subset of urban economies that
possess no fully-revealing MREE. Though it is for a selection of reasonable
equilibria in urban economics, the key feature of the designed information
augmentation process is perfect recall of all historical test prices. The follow-
ing example highlights the importance of this feature in urban economies.
For a given location k ∈ K, suppose that there are two states, Ωk ≡
{H,L}, and two types of households, M ≡ {1, 2}. Suppose that each type
1 household’s bid rent for the housing in k is 5 in H and 2 in L, and each
type 2 household’s bid rent for the housing in k is 3 in H and 5 in L. Type
1 households have full information while type 2 households do not. Type 2
households have a prior belief that both states are equally likely to happen, so
each type 2 household’s bid rent for the housing in k is 4 when they are given
only their private information. It is interesting to notice that, in this example,
there is no standard rational expectations equilibrium, fully revealing or not.
However, due to perfect recall of historical test prices, there exists a MREE
where households have full information in equilibrium but equilibrium prices
are the same in different states.24 Though type 2 households augment their
information from the test prices in step 1 instead of the equilibrium prices in
this example, this phenomenon is not generic.
Theorem 5 Generically, the set of MREE is a subset of REE.
24From the examples in Section 3, it is evident that the set of REE is not a subset of
MREE. From this example, it is evident that the set of MREE is not a subset of REE.
MREE is a subset of REE only when I = 1.
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Proof. See Appendix F.
Under perfect recall, since the final prices generically reveal all the infor-
mation carried by the test prices, the process by which we obtain the final
prices using test prices is just a way of proving the existence of MREE. That
is, the designed information augmentation process is helpful for solving equi-
librium but not essential for the results. On the other hand, since the result
based on an embedded perfect-recall learning process seems more reasonable
than the self-fulfilling logic used behind the standard rational expectations
equilibrium concept, the adoption of MREE is justified in urban economies.
A classical way to induce households to reveal their private information,
as shown in Debreu (1959) Chapter 7 and Arrow (1964), is to consider con-
tingent claim or financial markets. This idea is discussed in Section 7.
7 Adding Financial Markets
When contingent claims or financial markets are included, do our examples
with no fully-revealing MREE survive? This interesting question is examined
here.
Similar to Hirshleifer’s (1971) conclusion in cases with technological un-
certainty, speculative profits from price revaluation give individuals incen-
tives to disseminate their information. We show that when there is market
uncertainty, the same incentives exist and thus all households’ information
is revealed in equilibrium.
Following the setting of our Example 1 and Magill and Quinzii (1996),
consider that before consuming composite good and housing, the two house-
holds can buy and sell state-contingent financial securities in financial mar-
kets. That is, consider a one-period, two-stage model as follows. At the
beginning of the first stage, households are endowed with e0j units of nu-
meraire (composite consumer good), j = 1, 2. Household 2 has complete
information about the states in the two locations, whereas household 1 has
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no information. The financial markets are opened in stage 1, where the two
households can buy and sell securities. Assume that the financial markets
are complete in that the number of securities is the same as the number of
states, so we can use the same index for securities and states. Specifically,
the security ω, ω ∈ Ω, is a contract promising to deliver one unit of nu-
meraire (income) in state ω, and 0 in other states, in the second stage. All
securities are perfectly monitored and perfectly enforced. After closing the
financial markets and the end of the first stage, the state is realized and all
security returns are paid at the beginning of the second stage. Then an ab-
sentee landlord trades with households in spot housing markets. The game
is complete when the housing markets are closed. We want to know whether
or not there is a fully-revealing MREE under the new setting.
Let eωj be household j’s endowment in state ω in the second stage, and
let the row vector νj ≡ (νj(ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R4 be household j’s portfolio. Let q ≡
(q(ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R4 and V ≡ (V (ω))ω∈Ω ∈ R16 where q(ω) ∈ R and V (ω) ∈ R4
represent the price vector of security ω and the payoff matrix of securities
in state ω, respectively. That is, V (ω) is a row vector of zeros except that
the element representing state ω is 1, and V (ω) 6= V (ω′), for all ω 6= ω′.
The fully revealing MREE under the new setting can be solved by backward
induction as follows.
Suppose there exists a fully revealing MREE. From Section 2.2, given
Yj(ω), households’ indirect utility functions with optimization in stage 2 are
U1(ω) = α
ω
1 ln x¯− ln(1 + αω1 ) + lnY1(ω),
U2(ω) = β
ω
2 ln y¯ − ln(1 + βω2 ) + lnY2(ω).
Through monotonic transformations of these indirect utility functions, house-
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hold j’s optimization problem in stage 1 can be written as
max
νj
U˜j(ω) ≡ lnYj(ω)
s.t. q · νTj = e0j ,
Yj(ω)− eωj = V (ω) νTj , ω ∈ Ω,
where νTj denotes the transpose of j’s portfolio vector. Denoting the true
state as ωˆ, since households learn the true state by observing prices in a
fully revealing MREE, it is obvious that the equilibrium security prices must
satisfy q(ωˆ) = 1 and q(ω) = 0, ∀ω 6= ωˆ. Since for arbitrary different ωˆ, ωˆ′,
the corresponding equilibrium price vectors are not the same, each q∗ reveals
a unique ωˆ. Therefore, it follows that q∗ supports a fully-revealing MREE.
Though we show that adding financial markets helps to reveal the in-
formed household’s private information, there are some issues with this idea.
First and foremost is the assumption that the state is verifiable at the end
of the first stage so that contracts can be written. This assumption is incon-
sistent with the idea that an agent has to live in a location in order to learn
about a state there if that agent does not have prior information about it.
Second, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that the informed household can
use their private information to take advantage of uninformed households.
Thus, if the financial markets and the corresponding fully-revealing equilib-
rium prices make private information publicly available to every household,
the informed household could not earn an information rent (coming from
asymmetric information) and has an incentive to hide his/her private infor-
mation (by pretending to be uninformed). Therefore, though adding finan-
cial markets can restore the existence of a fully-revealing MREE, there are
reasons why these financial markets might not function. Of course, if finan-
cial asset markets are incomplete for whatever reason, the problems we have
discussed return.
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8 Conclusions
Radner (1979), Allen (1981), and Jordan (1982) prove the existence of an
open and dense subset of standard economies that possess fully-revealing ra-
tional expectations equilibria. Since in urban economies there is an open sub-
set of economies without fully-revealing MREE, Allen’s theorem about the
existence of a dense subset of economies possessing fully-revealing MREE
does not extend to urban economies when spatially local perturbations of
utilities are considered. These perturbations retain the property that the
utility of living at a location depends only on the consumption bundle at
that location and the resolution of uncertainty about local variables only.
Furthermore, since an open subset of economies with fully revealing MREE
can easily be constructed, we cannot challenge the existence of an open sub-
set of economies that possess fully-revealing MREE in the context of urban
economies. Therefore, neither the set of fully revealing nor the set of non-fully
revealing economies can be dense under the structure of urban economics.
This paper highlights the importance of “local conditions” for the ex-
istence of MREE in urban economies. The existence of a unique MREE
is proved with the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents.
Whether the MREE is fully revealing or non-fully revealing depends on the
insensitivity condition: When insensitivity is satisfied, the unique MREE
is non-fully revealing; otherwise, the equilibrium is fully revealing. When
an open-city model is considered where multiple people can reside in the
same location, it is demonstrated that an open subset of economies with
no fully revealing equilibrium can still exist even when the location is not
indivisible. Though introducing financial markets can restore the existence
of fully-revealing MREE, many provisos also accompany it. In summary,
geography can play a role in undermining the efficiency of market prices in
transmitting information from informed to uninformed households.
Here we consider classical urban economic models under the assumptions
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of perfect competition. It is, of course, possible to add non-market interac-
tions between agents as well as market frictions, but we leave this to future
work.
It is useful to note that in general, neither coarseness of agents’ actions nor
the type of indivisibility considered in our model is necessary or sufficient for
partially revealing REE. For a counterexample to necessity, consider Ausubel
(1990). For a counterexample to sufficiency, see Theorem 3.
As incorporated in our assumption that the state spaces in different loca-
tions are independent, our model applies primarily to cities. Application of
the model to neighborhoods, where this assumption is less plausible, is left
to future research.
Other topics for future research are to extend the intuition behind our
results to other models. For example, in an overlapping generations model,
time may play a role similar to the spatial structure in preventing information
transmission. Moreover, when search/matching models are considered, stable
equilibrium may also pick only the best of all potential matches. In either of
these cases, we conjecture that there exists an open subset of economies with
no fully-revealing MREE, since agents with information about states in other
lifetimes (in the overlapping generations framework) or in other equilibrium
matches (in the search framework) might not have their information reflected
in equilibrium prices.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Comparing Definition 1 and Definition 2, since condition (iii) is the same as
equations (4), for every ω ∈ Ω, we only need to prove that ((ψ∗j(ω))j∈N , P ∗(ω))
satisfies (i) and (ii) if and only if ((ϕ∗j(ω))j∈N ,Ψ
∗(ω)) satisfies (2) and (3),
given ϕ∗j(ω) = ψ
∗
j(ω), Ψ
∗
k(ω) = p
∗
k(ω), and u
∗
j(ω) = ujk(ψ
∗
jk(ω), ω), ∀j ∈ N ,
k ∈ K.
First, to prove this, given that (2) and (3) are satisfied but either (i) or
(ii) is not true, we want to show contradictions. If (i) is not true, there exists
Ω0 ⊆ Ω with µ(Ω0) > 0 such that P ∗k (ω) · ψ∗jk(ω) > Yk − Tk, ∀ω ∈ Ω0. Then
for ω ∈ Ω0, we have p∗k(ω)s∗jk(ω) + z∗jk(ω) > Yk − Tk, which together with
Ψ∗k(ω) = p
∗
k(ω) implies
Ψ∗k(ω) >
Yk − Tk − z∗jk(ω)
s∗jk(ω)
, ∀ω ∈ Ω0,
a contradiction with (2) and (3), given that the utility level is the same as
the optimal level in Definition 1, i.e., u∗j(ω) = ujk(ψ
∗
jk(ω), ω).
On the other hand, if (ii) is not true, then ∃j ∈ N and ψ′j(ω) within the
budget constraint such that
E[uj(ψ
′
j(ω), ω)
∣∣Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗k)] > E[uj(ψ∗j(ω), ω)∣∣Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗k)]. (44)
For this household j and for location k where she lives in equilibrium, we
can choose u∗j(ω) = E[uj(ψ
∗
j(ω), ω)
∣∣Fj ∨σ(Ψ∗k)], and then by strict concavity
and strict monotonicity, there exists  > 0 and ψ′′j (ω) ≡ ψ
′
j(ω)+ψ
∗
j (ω)
2
− 
such that E[uj(ψ
′′
j (ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗k)] = u∗j(ω). Since [Ψ∗k(ω) 1] · ψ′′jk(ω) <
Yk − Tk implies Ψ∗k(ω) <
Yk−Tk−z′′jk(ω)
s
′′
jk(ω)
,25 letting p
′′
k(ω) ≡
Yk−Tk−z′′jk(ω)
s
′′
jk(ω)
, we have
p
′′
k(ω) > Ψ
∗
k(ω), though ψ
′′
jk(ω) and ψ
∗
jk(ω) yield the same expected utility
level u∗j(ω). That is, given u
∗
j(ω), ψ
′′
jk(ω) supports a higher p
′′
k(ω) than Ψ
∗
k(ω).
Therefore, ϕ∗jk(ω) = ψ
∗
jk(ω) does not maximize Ψjk(u
∗
j(ω), ω), a contradiction
with equation (3).
25Recall that Ψ∗k(ω) ≡ Ψk(u∗(ω), ω) = maxj{Ψ∗jk(ω)}.
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Secondly, supposing that (i) and (ii) hold, but either (2) or (3) is not
satisfied, we want to prove that there is a contradiction. If (2) does not hold,
there exists k ∈ K, j ∈ N , and Ω0 ⊆ Ω with µ(Ω0) > 0 such that ∀ω ∈ Ω0,
Ψ∗jk(ω) > Ψ
∗
k(ω) but j does not live in location k. Suppose that j lives in
location k′ 6= k. Then for this household j, since she can pay less for the
housing in k than the price that makes her indifferent between the housing
in k and k′, household j has an incentive to move from k′ into location k
to increase his/her utility for all ω ∈ Ω0, a contradiction with condition (ii)
that ϕ∗j maximizes j’s conditional expected utility.
If (3) does not hold, the budget line with price Ψ∗jk(ω) is not tangent to
the indifference curve for a given u for some states ω ∈ Ω0, where µ(Ω0) > 0.
By strict concavity, there exists ψ
′
jk(ω) 6= ϕ∗jk(ω) such that ujk(ψ
′
jk(ω), ω) =
ujk(ϕ
∗
jk(ω), ω), and thus E[uj(ψ
′
j(ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗k)] = Eu∗j , where Eu∗j
is the optimal utility level solved from Definition 1. Choosing ψ
′′
jk(ω) ≡
ϕ∗jk(ω)+ψ
′
jk(ω)
2
, then by strict concavity, ψ
′′
jk(ω) is available for household j
in achieving a higher utility level, i.e., E[uj(ψ
′′
j (ω), ω)|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗k)] > Eu∗j ,
a contradiction with (ii) that ϕ∗j maximizes household j’s expected utility
conditional on the private information and the information revealed by equi-
librium prices.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider example 1 first. Notice that in equilibrium, household 1’s marginal
rate of substitution for housing in terms of composite commodity in location
x is
E[αω1 ]
1+E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯
. On the other hand, household 2’s marginal rate of substitution
for housing in x is
αω2
1+αω2
Y
x¯
. Let αHH1 = α
HL
1 > α
LH
1 = α
LL
1 and β
HH
1 = β
LH
1 >
βHL1 = β
LL
1 .
Since in the example E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[β
ω
1 ] < β2, we can choose 
α =
E[αω1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[α
ω
1 ]+α2)x¯
> 0, β = β2−E[β
ω
1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[β
ω
1 ]+β2)y¯
> 0, and  =
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min{α, β}. Recall that the equilibrium marginal utilities in example 1 are
v∗ ≡ (Ds1xEu∗1, Ds1yEu∗1, Dz1xEu∗1, Dz1yEu∗1, Ds2xu∗2(ω), Ds2yu∗2(ω), Dz2xu∗2(ω), Dz2yu∗2(ω)).
(45)
Centered at v∗, consider all spatially local perturbations of utility functions
within an open set in the weak Cr topology such that
Ds1kEu1 ∈ (Ds1kEu∗1 − ,Ds1kEu∗1 + ), (46)
Dz1kEu1 ∈ (Dz1kEu∗1 − ,Dz1kEu∗1 + ), (47)
Ds2ku2(ω) ∈ (Ds2ku∗2(ω)− ,Ds2ku∗2(ω) + ), (48)
Dz2ku2(ω) ∈ (Dz2ku∗2(ω)− ,Dz2ku∗2(ω) + ), k ∈ K. (49)
These perturbations are evaluated in k, k ∈ K, individually, and are thus
spatially local perturbations. Then it can be checked that all utilities within
this neighborhood generate bid rents that are within  of the equilibrium
bid rents in example 1. Furthermore, household 1’s realized marginal rate of
substitution for housing in terms of composite good in location x is always
higher than the marginal rate of substitution of household 2; household 2’s
marginal rate of substitution for housing in location y is always higher than
that of household 1.26
Now we can prove the non-existence of fully revealing MREE for all
economies in this neighborhood. Suppose for any set of preferences within
these local perturbations, there exists a fully revealing MREE (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2,Ψ
∗).
Then the uninformed household (household 1) can infer the state of nature
by observing Ψ∗−kj . However, within the perturbations, the equilibrium bid
rents are the same across states, contradicting that Ψ∗ is a fully-revealing
MREE price.
26In location x, for example, since the lowest MRS for household 1 is
E[αω1 ]/x¯−
(1+E[αω1 ])/Y+
,
and the highest MRS for household 2 is α2/x¯+(1+α2)/Y− , household 1’s MRS is greater
than household 2’s MRS if and only if  < α =
E[αω1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[α
ω
1 ]+α2)x¯
. Simi-
larly, household 2’s MRS in location y is greater than that of household 1 if and only
if  < β =
β2−E[βω1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[β
ω
1 ]+β2)y¯
.
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Obviously, a similar argument works for the cases with more than 2 states
and example 2.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 2
Before beginning the proof, a general remark about existence of rational
expectations equilibrium is in order. For equilibrium that is not fully reveal-
ing, one generally requires a fixed point in prices and the public information
structure, since prices determine what consumers learn from them, and the
information structure determines which prices must be the same in different
states due to measurability. In general, the information structure does not
have the mathematical properties required for application of a fixed point
theorem. So we sidestep this issue.
First, we use the implication from Lemma 1 that bid rent equilibrium is
a MREE. Next, a bid rent equilibrium will be constructed, and the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium will be proved. Finally, it will be shown
that the unique bid rent (modified rational expectations) equilibrium is non-
fully revealing.
Following a standard argument in urban economics, given Assumption 1,
every location is occupied by exactly one household. Since household 1 has
the steepest bid rent, from equation (2) in Definition 2, she must occupy
the housing in location 1 in equilibrium. After settling household 1, we can
consider the problem as the one with n − 1 households (j ∈ {2, ..., n}) and
n − 1 locations (k ∈ {2, ..., n}). Then, household 2 has a steeper bid rents
than remaining households, so his/her equilibrium bid rent for the housing in
location 2 is higher than that of other households. Therefore, in equilibrium,
household 2 occupies the housing in location 2. Following the same logic, in
equilibrium all households are arranged so that household j lives in location
j, j ∈ N , or say that location k is occupied by household k, k ∈ K.
Given that household k is located in location k, as shown in Figure 5, the
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intercept of budget line Yj−Tk and the housing supply s¯k are determined by
parameters. Now, given arbitrary u, the slope of budget line Ψk(u, ω) and
the corresponding ϕkk(u, ω) are uniquely determined (by the cross point of
the budget line and the vertical line s¯k). Furthermore, given consumption
point ϕkk(u, ω), since households’ preferences are smooth, the slope of the
indifference curve passing through ϕ∗kk(u, ω) is uniquely determined. For-
mally, letting Φkk(u, ω) ≡ Dskk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω),ω)|Fk∨σ(Ψ
∗)]
Dzkk(ω)E[ukk(ψkk(ω),ω)|Fk∨σ(Ψ∗)]
∣∣
ϕkk(u,ω)
, the equilib-
rium utility level (and the equilibrium housing price in location k) is given
by solving Ψk(u, ω) = Φkk(u, ω), ω ∈ Ω, as shown in Figure 5. Letting
fkk(u, ω) ≡ Ψk(u, ω)−Φkk(u, ω), since Ψk and Φkk are continuous in u, fkk is
continuous in u. At E¯, fkk(u, ω) < 0 since Ψk(u, ω) = 0 and Φkk(u, ω) > 0 at
E¯ by monotonicity. Given s¯k > 0, Ψk(u, ω) is increasing as zkk(ω) decreases
and, by the smooth boundary condition, Φkk(u, ω)→ 0 as zkk(ω)→ 0, which
implies that ∃u such that fkk(u, ω) > 0,∀u ≤ u. Therefore, by the interme-
diate value theorem, there exists a u∗k(ω) solving fkk(u, ω) = 0, ω ∈ Ω, and
thus, there exists a MREE. The uniqueness of equilibrium can be guaranteed
by the condition that Φkk(u, ω) is increasing in u, which is true when the
consumption of housing is a normal good as shown in Berliant and Fujita
(1992).
Under insensitivity, we want to prove that the unique MREE is non-fully
revealing. Suppose on the contrary that the equilibrium is fully-revealing,
then choosing arbitrary k, we have
Ψ∗k(ω) = Ψkk(u
∗(ω), ω) 6= Ψkk(u∗(ω), ω′) = Ψ∗k(ω′), (50)
∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, ω 6= ω′. First, for household k (living in location k in equilib-
rium), any such pair (ω, ω′) must be in different partition elements. That is,
Fk ∨ σ(Ψ∗−k) = F . Second, from (38) and (40), Ψk(u, ω) 6= Ψk(u, ω′) implies,
∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
Dskk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
Dzkk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
6= Dskk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω
′), ω′)
Dzkk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω
′), ω′)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω′)
. (51)
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Figure 5: The determination of equilibrium housing price and equilibrium
utility for household k in location k in state ω, k ∈ K.
However, from insensitivity, there exist ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that
Dskk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
Dzkk(ω)ukk(ψkk(ω), ω)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω)
=
Dskk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω
′), ω′)
Dzkk(ω′)ukk(ψkk(ω
′), ω′)
∣∣∣
ϕ∗kk(ω′)
, (52)
a contradiction with (51).
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 3
From Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, as in the proof of Theorem 2, there
exists a MREE which corresponds to the bid rent equilibrium. When the
insensitivity condition is violated, the realized marginal rates of substitution
are different ∀ωk ∈ Ωk, for the consumer living in location k. Furthermore,
with no insensitivity, σ˜k ⊆ Fk for the household k living in k; otherwise,
there exist ωk, ω
′
k ∈ Ωk that can be distinguished by j′ 6= k who does not live
in k, a contradiction with no insensitivity. Since this is true for all k ∈ K,
and the equilibrium bid rent in k is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
of household living in k, the equilibrium bid rents are different in each state,
implying that the MREE is fully revealing.
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Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 4
First, we want to show the equilibrium always exists and is unique in the
open city model. Secondly, an open-city economy with no fully revealing
equilibrium is found. Finally, centered at this open-city economy, a spatially
local perturbation in utilities is introduced so that all corresponding open-
city economies possess no fully revealing equilibrium.
When condition (43) is satisfied with I = 1, a unique MREE is con-
stituted immediately. When I > 1, condition (43) implies that in steps 1
to I − 1, there exists at least one household who can learn something new
from observing test prices, and in step I no one can further augment her
accumulated information. Therefore, the test prices until step I and the
corresponding augmented information constitute a MREE. Recall that the
state space is finite and every household’s sigma algebra is weakly getting
bigger during the information augmentation process. During the process,
if there exists one step such that no household’s sigma algebra is getting
strictly bigger, then nothing new is revealed by test prices and a MREE is
attained. Otherwise, at least one household’s sigma algebra is getting strictly
bigger in each step. Since there are at most 2||Ω|| elements in σ(Ω) and all
households’ bid rent functions must be measurable in σ(Ω),27 there exists a
finite integer I ≤ 2||Ω|| such that conditions (42) and (43) are both satisfied,
constituting an equilibrium which is fully revealing. Given households’ initial
private information, since the information augmentation process is unique,
there always exists a unique MREE in the open city model.
Consider an open city model analogous to Example 2 in Section 2. That
is, there are two types of households (M ≡ {1, 2}) with Cobb-Douglas util-
ity functions specified in Example 2. There are two available locations, K ≡
{x, y}, each of which is endowed with two states, i.e., Ω ≡ {HH,HL,LH,LL}.
Recall that F1 = {φ,Ωx}× {φ,Ωy, {H}, {L}} and F2 = {φ,Ωx, {H}, {L}}×
27||Ω|| denotes the number of elements in Ω.
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{φ,Ωy} is every type 1 and 2 household’s private information, respectively.
Given u¯ ≡ (u¯1, u¯2) and Fj, j ∈ M , such that x ∈ k1(ω) and y ∈ k2(ω),
∀ω ∈ Ω, from (42),
Ψ(0)x (ω) = E[α
ω
1 ](1 + E[α
ω
1 ])
−(1+ 1
E[αω1 ]
)
e
− u¯1
E[αω1 ] (Y1 − Tx)1+
1
E[αω1 ] , (53)
Ψ(0)y (ω) = E[β
ω
2 ](1 + E[β
ω
2 ])
−(1+ 1
E[βω2 ]
)
e
− u¯2
E[βω2 ] (Y2 − Ty)1+
1
E[βω2 ] , ∀ω ∈ Ω. (54)
Since Fj ∨ σ(Ψ(0)k ) = Fj, ∀j ∈ M , k ∈ K, it can be checked that Ψ(1)k (ω) =
Ψ
(0)
k (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, Ψ(1)k is measurable in Fj ∨ σ(Ψ(0)k ), ∀j ∈ M ,
k ∈ K. In the MREE, Ψ∗k(ω) = Ψ(1)k (ω) = Ψ(0)k (ω), ∀k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω.
Moreover, the equilibrium population of type j households living in k is
N∗jk(ω) =

s¯k
s∗jk(ω)
, for k ∈ kj(ω),
0, if k /∈ kj(ω).
(55)
where s∗1x(ω) = (
(1+E[αω1 ])e
u¯1
Y1−Tx )
1
E[αω1 ] and s∗2y(ω) = (
(1+E[βω2 ])e
u¯2
Y2−Ty )
1
E[βω2 ] , ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Since (53), (54), and Ψ∗k(ω) = Ψ
(1)
k (ω) imply that Ψ
∗
k(ω) is a constant for all
states, k ∈ K, the equilibrium is not fully revealing. Furthermore, since the
MREE is always uniquely, there is no fully revealing MREE in the illustrated
open-city economy.
Centered at u¯, consider arbitrary perturbations in utility levels (∆u¯j)j∈M
such that no household changes his/her equilibrium location. That is, letting
αHH2 = α
HL
2 > α
LH
2 = α
LH
2 and β
HH
1 = β
LH
1 > β
HL
1 = β
LL, we choose
1 ≡ 1E[αω1 ]+βHH2 (E[α
ω
1 ]u¯2 − βHH2 u¯1 + E[αω1 ]βHH2 (ln[E[αω1 ]] − ln[βHH2 ]) + (1 +
E[αω1 ])β
HH
2 (ln[Y1−Tx]− ln[1 +E[αω1 ]])− (1 +βHH2 )E[αω1 ](ln[Y2−Tx]− ln[1 +
βHH2 ])), 2 ≡ 1αHH1 +E[βω2 ](E[β
ω
2 ]u¯1−αHH1 u¯2 +αHH1 E[βω2 ](ln[E[βω2 ]]− ln[αHH1 ])+
(1+E[βω2 ])α
HH
1 (ln[Y2−Ty]−ln[1+E[βω2 ]])−(1+αHH1 )E[βω2 ](ln[Y1−Ty]−ln[1+
αHH1 ])), and  = min{1, 2}, then it can be checked that Ψ(1)1x (ω) > Ψ(1)2x (ω)
and Ψ
(1)
2y (ω) > Ψ
(1)
1y (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. Since bid rent functions are continuous in
u¯j, for all perturbations (∆u¯j)j∈M such that |∆u¯j| < , ∀j ∈M , there exists
a unique non-fully revealing MREE in each perturbed economy. Therefore,
it is proved that there exists an open subset of economies that possess no
fully-revealing MREE.
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Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 5
The statement of Theorem 5 is equivalent to saying that under perfect re-
call final prices Ψ
(I)
k generically reveal the information carried by test prices
(Ψ
(i)
k )i=0,1,...,I−1.
For the openness part, when I = 1, the proof is trivial. When I > 1,
(Ψ
(i)
k )i=0,1,...,I−1 implies a process of changes in households’ locations and in
test prices. Condition (43) implies that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ I−1, ∃k ∈ K, ω, ω′ ∈
Ω, ω 6= ω′, such that Ψ(i)k (ω) 6= Ψ(i)k (ω′). Denoting d(i)k ≡ |Ψ(i)k (ω)− Ψ(i)k (ω′)|
and d¯ ≡ min{(d(i)k )i=0,1,...,I−1;j∈M}, similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we
can consider perturbations of utility functions such that the same process of
households’ locations is implied. That is, 0 < |Ψ(i)k (ω)−Ψ(i)k (ω′)| < d¯ for the
same k ∈ K and the same ω, ω′ ∈ Ω after perturbations. Then, the same
information augmentation process is followed, and it is proved the subset of
economies where final prices reveal the information carried by test prices is
always open.
For the denseness part, as illustrated in the example in the text, when
final prices cannot reveal the information implied by test prices, there must
exist k ∈ K, j, j′ ∈ M , j 6= j′, and ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, ω 6= ω′, such that Ψ(I)jk (ω) =
Ψ
(I)
j′k(ω
′). Since this equality is necessary for final prices failing in revealing
the information of test prices, however, we can always find Ψ
(I)
jk (ω) 6= Ψ(I)j′k(ω′)
for arbitrary small preference perturbations, so the subset of economies where
final prices reveal the information carried by test prices is dense.
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